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Introduction
In the aftermath of the American Revolution, the United Kingdom and
its former colonies split not only in their political ties, but also in systems
of law.  Even in years prior, a new philosophy concerning the legal system
began to mount in America: a concept of “republicanism” that emphasized
the importance of the common good and meritocracy over more traditional
hierarchies of wealth and birth.1  In order to foster a new civic republic and
prevent the encroachment of aristocratic tendencies, the Founders and the
† J.D. Candidate 2019, Cornell Law School.
1. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776– 1787 47
(1969).
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philosophers they drew from gained a keen interest in using law to
encourage “virtue” among citizens, hoping to prevent societal corruption
and rot through use of public policies that combated any “aristocracy of
wealth” and instead sought an “aristocracy of virtue and talent.”2  Though
this ideal translated into a number of innovations in both constitutional
law and the American political process, it also found its way into the broad
and narrow strokes of property law.  It viewed the ownership of property
as a vital part of promoting civic virtue, by nurturing autonomy, liberating
the owner to pursue personal development, and grounding oneself in a
political community.3
With these ideas came reforms, ones that distanced and distinguished
the emerging American common law from that of its former mother coun-
try.  In contrast to the British legal system, the Founders set about a num-
ber of legal innovations with the hopes of promoting this new republican
ideal of property law, such as the notable campaigns against the traditional
fee tail and primogeniture inheritance laws.4  However famed these
reforms might have been, however, they were by no means the only experi-
ments made by the Founders in promoting a new republicanism through
the boundaries of property law.  This Note will seek to compare the Ameri-
can and British property law systems both before the Revolutionary War
and soon after it, and to find what other changes the Founders considered
and made when they tried to create a new legal path for a newly born
nation.  This Note argues that several innovations were directly influenced
by the republican ideal that much of the American Revolution was predi-
cated upon, seeking to promote virtue in the new republic by means of
personal property and how the law treated it.  Furthermore, this Note will
apply republicanism to a more contemporary problem.  Specifically, it will
examine whether the theory of republicanism and property can be used to
justify the estate tax, a long-standing part of the American and British tax
codes that has recently come under significant pressure for repeal within
the United States.
Part I of this Note examines the origins of this republican idea of prop-
erty, tracing its roots from more ancient philosophies of Greece, through
the British common law system, to its moment of fruition in colonial
America.  It will detail the exact contours and parameters that republican-
ism was predicated upon, so as to better illustrate how those ideas were (or
were not) translated into British and American law.
Part II will look more closely at the schism that transpired between the
United Kingdom and the fledgling United States on the subject of property.
Specifically, it will examine several of the well-known reform measures
taken regarding the fee tail and primogeniture inheritance schemes that
2. Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, in 1 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3, 58
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904).
3. See J.G.A. Pocock, The Mobility of Property and the Rise of the Eighteenth-Century
Sociology, in VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY 103, 103 (1985).
4. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 182– 84
(1993).
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still permeated British law, as well as the statements made by the Founders
about how republicanism could best fit into a new American common law.
Part III will argue that the estate tax is a practice not at all alien to the
ideals of republicanism, but is instead a means of curtailing the inequali-
ties in wealth that the Framers thought a threat to republican society.  In
greater detail, it will examine the history of estate and inheritance tax pol-
icy in the United States and compare that with policies adopted in other
nations like the UK.  It will go on to examine the role that changes in prop-
erty law play in the larger republican ideal envisioned by the Founders.
Furthermore, it will examine whether the theory of republicanism can be
used to justify the continued existence of a contemporary issue in redistrib-
utive policies: the much beleaguered estate tax.  By both applying the ten-
ets of republicanism to the issue and by examining the words of great
republican thinkers both within the Framers and without, it will demon-
strate just how the idea of an estate tax fits within the republican
framework.
Finally, the Conclusion will summarize the argument that the estate
tax can be justified on republican grounds.  In so doing, it will draw on all
the information laid out beforehand and demonstrate the roots of the
estate tax in republican theory and practice.
I. Republicanism and Property
A. Republicanism Defined
“Republicanism” itself was an idea that had greater implications for
Americans “than simply the elimination of a king and the institution of an
elective system,” as difficult as those tasks might have been.5  Rather, it
stood for a broader idea that “private ‘interests’ could and should be subor-
dinated to the common welfare of the polity,” thus seeking to discourage
selfish and destructive instincts for the sake of the common good of all.6
Rather than viewing a “Lockean emphasis on the protection of individual
rights . . . as the sole foundation of American constitutional thought,”
scholarship can identify classical republicanism as a heavy influence on
the Founders.7  That influence manifests in a focus on the common good, a
wariness of pure democracy rather than mixed government, and— perhaps
surprisingly— a certain degree of skepticism for some aspects of “com-
merce and capitalism” due to its rural and agrarian sensibilities.8
In this sense, American politics at the founding was most concerned
not with “the protection of individual freedoms against collective encroach-
ment,” but instead with “protecting the political liberty of the collective”
itself— fostering measures that defended public rights against corruption
and “aristocratic privileges.”9  Republicanism can thus be contrasted with
5. WOOD, supra note 1, at 47.
6. GREGORY ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY 29 (1997).
7. Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1663 (1988).
8. Id. at 1664.
9. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 29. R
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liberalism, with the former standing for “communitarianism” as opposed
to “the latter’s individualism.”10  Whereas liberalism focused on the “moral
primacy” of the individual, republicanism was concerned with the interests
of the community as a whole, and generally put that interest above individ-
ual interests.11
Unlike conceptions of “possessive individualism,” which imagined
property as a means of protecting individuals from the tyranny of the col-
lective, civic republicanism instead saw property’s primary role as
“facilitat[ing] a publicly active, self-governing citizenry,” with ownership of
property becoming a “necessary foundation for virtue.”12  Virtue in this
scheme was in many ways “a synonym for autonomy in action,” which
functioned “not merely [as] a moral abstraction,” but rather as “a human
necessity” that could help drive a political society.13  Owning one’s own
property meant a citizen had a degree of autonomy, rather than depen-
dence on others, and furthermore served “as a means of anchoring the
individual in the structure of power and virtue and liberating him to prac-
tice these activities.”14  By contrast, a citizen lacking in property finds one-
self utterly dependent upon others, thus lacking the independence to act
on their own behalf or with the will to function as a virtuous citizen in an
enlightened and well-governed republic.15
B. The Aristotelean Origin
Republican thought originated not in America itself nor in Britain, but
rather in the more ancient theories of classical Greece, most notably with
Aristotle.16  In Aristotle’s conception of politics, the most practical form of
government was one rooted in moderation of political extremes, achieved
via mixing forms of aristocracy, monarchy, and democracy in the name of
stable and virtuous government.17  From this framework rose what we
refer to as Aristotelian republicanism, a brand that was “exclusively con-
cerned with the citizen,” specifically on “his chances of escaping corrup-
tion.”18  To Aristotle, “man is by nature a political animal”— he exists as a
member of a larger community, whether that be family, clan, tribe, polis, or
eventually nation.19  Within this system, “it is better for property to be pri-
vate,” but that “citizens become such as to use it in common,” with the task
of the lawmaker being to encourage this kind of community-minded senti-
10. Frank Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence and Constitutional Property, in LIBERTY,
PROPERTY, AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 127, 130 (Ellen Frankel
Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1990).
11. See id.
12. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 30– 31.
13. POCOCK, supra note 3, at 122.
14. JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF
THE 1790S 9 (1984).
15. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 74. R
16. See id. at 29.
17. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 114– 17 (Carnes Lord trans., U. Chi. Press 2d ed. 2013).
18. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 329 (1975).
19. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 17, at 4. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN304.txt unknown Seq: 5 28-JAN-19 9:57
2018 The Republic of Virtue 735
ment in their fellow citizens.20
The reason for this is that differences in the degree of property owner-
ship— and thus wealth— among citizens can lead to conflict: a city popu-
lated only by the extremely poor and the extremely wealthy quickly
descends into “a city not of free persons but of slaves and masters,” with
the former “consumed by envy” and the latter consumed “by contempt.”21
“Nothing is further removed from affection and from a political commu-
nity,” and few things have as deleterious an effect on civic virtue.22  Thus,
Aristotle proposes that the city “be made up of equal and similar persons
to the extent possible,” cultivating a large class of “middling” people who,
with a moderate amount of property in which they feel both attachment
and contentment, are able to best conduct political matters while not desir-
ing “the things of others.”23  Property ownership in Aristotle’s republican-
ism mirrors his larger conception of politics: it encourages a middle
ground that avoids both “rule of the people in its extreme form,” a crude
and destructive anarchy, or “unmixed oligarchy” that— without the restraint
of a mixed government— results in “tyranny.”24
C. From Florence to Great Britain and Elsewhere
Aristotle’s idea of republicanism, both in politics and in property,
found fertile ground outside of his own country and own era.  Much of the
republican tradition can be traced to its adoption by various Florentine
political thinkers, most notably in the works of Niccolo Machiavelli.25  He
and other Renaissance figures found in classical republicanism a political
theory that was rich in its implications for life in the new polis of their time,
but perhaps also brittle, “tend[ing] to reduce politics to the structure within
which the individual asserted his moral autonomy” with little regard given
to the role of legislation or the “positive” use of power.26  What Machiavelli
produced himself, alongside others, was a “Renaissance rephrasing” of
Aristotle’s republicanism, one that incorporated distinct theories of mili-
tary and political science “in the service of a basically Aristotelian method”
of describing the functions of a city and how the collision of these elements
“lead to stability, instability, or change in the polity.”27
This variation gave a breath of fresh life into an ancient theory, lend-
ing it “a high degree of capacity for dealing with the social phenomena of
20. See id. at 31.
21. Id. at 115.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 116.
25. See POCOCK, supra note 18, at 316 (“[T]he most vivid impression remaining R
should be that of the continuity of a basically Aristotelian republicanism from which
Machiavelli did not seem . . . to have greatly departed.”).
26. Id. at 329 (“[A] view of politics which confined it to the assertion of values, or
virtues, by individuals in public acts discouraged, every time that it encouraged, any
attempt to treat it as the concurrent exercise of different kinds of power.”).
27. See id. at 317.
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the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.”28  It was precisely this Floren-
tine interpretation of Aristotle’s republicanism that was later referred to by
political thinkers in Britain and revolutionary America, all whilst retaining
its essential “moralist concern with liberty and corruption” that “pre-
sent[ed] politics as the erection of conditions under which men might
freely exercise active virtue.”29
The entrance of republicanism into American parlance began on the
opposite side of the Atlantic, with seventeenth-century British theorists
such as James Harrington who followed the Machiavellian tradition.30
Analyzing the strengths of governments from a historical perspective, Har-
rington espoused the republican theory that any polity overly focused
upon “the one, the few and the many” will be doomed to decline and fall,
and instead it is the duty of legislators to create “a government so com-
pounded of all three elements that the degenerative tendencies held one
another in check.”31  Harrington agreed with his predecessors in finding
that government has a duty to promote virtue in its citizens, for the sake of
defeating “its corresponding vice” that would eventually bring down a mor-
ally compromised order.32
However, Harrington also staked out a crucial— and innovative— differ-
ence from his predecessor Machiavelli, one rooted in the role of property in
addressing virtue.33  Contrary to what his Florentine model presumed,
“Harrington denies Machiavelli’s conviction that a people once thoroughly
corrupt cannot be saved even by the wisest legislator.”34  Instead, Harring-
ton’s conclusion is that “the causes of corruption are in an unjust distribu-
tion of land,” and that such inequalities of property can be addressed by a
government enforced by an appropriate constitution.35
Harrington’s interpretation of Aristotle’s “balance” of classes is one
that envisions a government where “great accumulations of wealth [are]
dispersed,” with citizens instead owning small parcels of land that allow an
individual to be independent.36  This independence is vital to be a true
citizen: without it, the citizen is little more than a servant lacking “distinct
interests” of his own, and being “bound to the wills of others,” he is incapa-
ble of “properly participat[ing] in government as [a] free agent[ ].”37  Due
to his own experience in living as part of a largely agrarian society, Har-
28. Id.
29. Id. (“It was in the Aristotelian and civic humanist channel that the stream of
republican tradition was to flow, and Machiavelli as a historical figure, to whom theo-
rists like Harrington and Adams referred, was to swim quite successfully in that
channel.”).
30. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 129 (1957).
31. Id. at 145.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 146.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See James Cotton, James Harrington as Aristotelian, 7 POL. THEORY 371, 379– 80
(1979).
37. Id. at 380.
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rington added an additional wrinkle to republicanism that the more urbane
Machiavelli neglected, providing an idea that would find fertile soil in colo-
nial America.38
II. Republicanism in Practice: Contrasting Britain and America
After crossing the Atlantic, the Harrington conception of republican-
ism and property became “a clear influence upon the early formulation of
American politics,” to the extent that “the American Founding can be
linked to the Atlantic Republican Tradition.”39  Several of the Founders fol-
lowed this strain of republicanism, noting “the importance of property
divisions in preserving state Republican governments.”40  The American
revolution itself can be understood as a “condemnation of the [British] sys-
tem as irretrievably tainted” and a subsequent “departure to construct a
mixed government along republican lines.”41  American rhetoric at the
time was itself steeped in precisely the same espousal of “the virtue of the
citizen as the only guard against corruption” that graced much of republi-
can thought in prior eras, and viewed the breaking from Great Britain and
creation of a new government based around a separation of powers to be
the proper means of promoting virtue.42
Thomas Jefferson, specifically, expressed a distinctly republican belief
that “society creates property rights and ought continually to control
them,” a marked difference from the Lockean idea of inviolable property
rights.43  Like Aristotle, Jefferson believed man to be “social by nature,”
and furthermore that it was necessary for men to subdue “selfish passions”
for civilization and “rule based on natural equality” to triumph.44  Yet Jef-
ferson can be distinguished from Locke in that he “did not consider pre-
serving [property] to be the chief end of government.”45  Instead, Jefferson
believed in a “summum bonum, a greatest good” that could be achieved by
citizens, one that was made available through an individual’s self-suffi-
ciency and a government that promoted “safety and happiness.”46
Following the end of the Revolution, the nascent United States faced a
new question: “how their free institutions were to be kept from corrup-
tion,” the kind that republicanism was eternally concerned with halting.47
38. See POCOCK, supra note 30, at 146– 47. R
39. David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting Depictions of Prop-
erty in the American Political Founding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 464, 474 (1993).
40. Id. at 476.
41. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE VARIETIES OF BRITISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1500– 1800 285
(1993).
42. See id. at 295.
43. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 27. R
44. DAVID TUCKER, ENLIGHTENED REPUBLICANISM: A STUDY OF JEFFERSON’S Notes on the
State of Virginia 74 (2008).
45. Id. at 88 (“[Jefferson’s belief in property’s lesser importance] is why he replaced
‘property’ with ‘the pursuit of happiness’ when enumerating inalienable rights in the
Declaration of Independence,” and “advised Lafayette to remove the word ‘property’
from the proposed Declaration of the Rights of Man.”).
46. See id. at 88– 89.
47. See POCOCK, supra note 41, at 295.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN304.txt unknown Seq: 8 28-JAN-19 9:57
738 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 51
During the nation’s formative years, political figures like James Madison
said explicitly that the Union would be one organized along republican
grounds, with a representative government as opposed to a strictly demo-
cratic one.48  This meant the development of new political structures, such
as divided legislatures, federalism, and separation of powers, all of which
were designed to avoid the dreaded excesses thought to undermine virtu-
ous authority.49  In other ways, the Founders looked to English sources as
guides for creating a legitimate government.50  However, stark differences
between the republicanism of a newly-born America and their former
mother country arose swiftly; certain reform measures taken before and
after the Revolution make clear that the Founders saw their own enterprise
as distinct from that of prior English thinkers, affirming certain parts of
English law while deliberately leaving others behind.51
A. Property in the Constitution
The new republic created by the Founders would be one centered
around a constitution, one that was meant at least in part to enshrine cer-
tain property rights.52  Property itself is explicitly found in two sections of
the United States Constitution: the Fifth Amendment and the later-added
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth.53  In the former, property is
brought up in the context of the Takings Clause, which guarantees that a
citizen’s private property cannot “be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”54  In the latter, the restrictions of the Fifth Amendment are
also directed to the states, ensuring that no state within the nation can
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”55
While the Fourteenth Amendment arose almost a century after the
Founders first passed the Constitution, it promotes the same idea of “pro-
cedural due process” that was seeded during the American Revolution.56
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause arose from the outrage over British
actions that allowed for the confiscation of property in ways that “abridged
common law criminal procedures,” with the colonists believing that “Par-
liament lack[ed] the authority to deprive them of core procedural protec-
tions.”57  This same attitude found its way into the state constitutions as
well, with all but two of the states adopting written constitutions by 1780,
and a vast majority of those constitutions including “law-of-the-land provi-
48. See id. at 296.
49. See id. at 295.
50. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 44. R
51. See id. at 44– 46.
52. See James Y. Stern, Property’s Constitution, 101 CAL. L. REV. 277, 279 (2013).
53. See id. at 277.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, YALE L.J. 1672, 1700 (2012).
57. Id. at 1699– 1700.
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sions” that protected property rights.58  In terms of how the Constitution
approaches property rights, constitutional property law doctrine is under-
stood to center around “changes in property rights,” forbidding “certain
alterations to existing allocations of property rights.”59
B. Inheritance in Early America
When British settlers first began their colonization of America, they
brought many aspects of the “English gentry and landed aristocracy” with
them.  As a result, early settlements like Jamestown were ruled by “a small
group of leaders drawn from the higher echelons of English society.”60
This hierarchy was deeply engrained into the social structure of Great Brit-
ain at the time, such that “nothing could be more alien” than a demand
“that competition for political leadership should be open to all levels of
society.”  Instead, the “proper response” to new challenges arising for pub-
lic servants “was not to give power to the skilled but to give skills to the
powerful.”61  So entrenched were these attitudes that “[i]n the first years of
settlement no one had reason to expect that this characteristic of public life
would fail to transfer itself to the colonies.”62  However, in the case of Brit-
ain’s oldest colonies in Virginia, “this governing elite did not survive a sin-
gle generation, at least in its original form,” and in due time “their number
had declined to insignificance.”63  While a new style of aristocracy did
eventually grow in American soil, it was one immediately distinguishable
from their peers across the Atlantic in their treatment of property.64
1. Primogeniture and Entailment
The two “most glaring vestiges of a corrupt past” in property law,
according to American adherents of republicanism, were the systems of pri-
mogeniture in inheritance law and the entailment of land.65  Eighteenth-
century England made use of inheritance and ownership devices to ensure
the “descent of landed estates,” a system that was meant to guarantee the
eldest son— born or otherwise— would accede to his family’s property by
“entailing its descent.”66  Entailment itself dated back to medieval times, a
practice designed specifically by the nobility to “secure and protect their
families’ hold on the land” they came to own.67  The entail of property
essentially acted as a ‘dead hand’ upon an estate even after the owner died,
58. See id. at 1705.
59. Id. at 287.
60. Bernard Bailyn, Politics and Social Structure in Virginia, in 1 NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
THE AMERICAN PAST 38– 39 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 2d. 1969).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 39.
63. Id. at 40.
64. See id. at 52.
65. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 39. R
66. See Bailyn, supra note 60, at 52. R
67. See John V. Orth, After the Revolution: “Reform” of the Law of Inheritance, 10 L. &
HIST. REV. 33, 36– 37 (1992).
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due to it restricting the ability of the heir to alienate the land he received.68
Once the entail was created voluntarily by the land’s original owner, any
successive holder would be restricted or prevented from altering the
arrangement, regardless of their own voluntary choices, thus allowing a
past owner to control its future scions.69
This mechanism of property ownership was effective enough that
“perhaps half the land of England was bound” through it— all but ensuring
“continuity over generations for the landed aristocracy.”70  Thus, it hap-
pened that a member of the landed gentry of England “could dispose more
or less freely of his wherewithal by will,” in a manner that “operated clearly
in favor of his immediate family.”71  Having been transported across the
Atlantic along with the British colonists, America as well would look for-
ward to enjoying the benefits of “one of the most complicated and least
satisfactory branches of English law.”72
At the same time, however, this means of preserving aristocratic con-
trol of lands failed to take root in America.73  Part of this can be ascribed to
circumstance: unlike in England, land was not at all scarce in Colonial
America, where the colonists could enjoy a large and recently depopulated
continent’s worth of territory to settle and exploit.74  On the other hand,
America was also home to a “social and political structure” that was “vastly
less aristocratic” than its English counterpart, a fact that led to a longstand-
ing campaign for reform against the inheritance laws.75  Some attempts
were made at forbidding entailment prior to the Revolution, such as a Vir-
ginian act allowing them only in certain circumstances, but for the most
part the inheritance law “largely adhered to the English system,” with
attempts to abolish it undercut by subsequent legislation that restored the
docking of entails.76
Jefferson, however, embarked upon a sustained campaign to see these
vestiges of English property law eliminated from the American system,
reaching success on October 14, 1776 with legislation that abolished
entails.77  In this statute, a fee tail created by a landowner would be found
as a fee simple instead, while any “remainder in tail following an estate for
life” or any other, lesser estate would “be converted into a remainder in fee
simple,” ultimately undercutting the inalienability that made entailment so
potent.78  Explicitly done in the interest of a new policy on property own-
ership, Jefferson followed this with a statute some three years later that
68. See Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American
Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1977).
69. See Orth, supra note 67, at 37. R
70. Bailyn, supra note 60, at 52. R
71. Katz, supra note 68, at 10. R
72. Id. at 9– 10.
73. See Bailyn, supra note 60, at 52– 53.
74. See Katz, supra note 68 at 11.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 12.
77. See id.
78. See Orth, supra note 67, at 39. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN304.txt unknown Seq: 11 28-JAN-19 9:57
2018 The Republic of Virtue 741
abolished primogeniture and “replace[d] it with partible inheritance in
equal shares to the children of a decedent.”79  State constitutions followed
suit, with legislatures in Pennsylvania and South Carolina creating provi-
sions that openly called on the state lawmakers to take measures that
would regulate or else eliminate entailment and primogeniture.80  The
resulting statutes would see primogeniture replaced with an inheritance
scheme that evenly divided the decedent’s property “among all children of
either sex,” while the entail was “hampered” to the point of being function-
ally abolished.81  By contrast, England itself did not follow in abolishing
primogeniture until 1925.82
2. The Frontier and Republicanism
The availability of land also played an important role in American
republicanism.  Jefferson and others like him were outspoken in their belief
that the American frontier represented a unique opportunity in promoting
a new society of small, independent farmers, with the promotion of mea-
sures that opened new territory for these agrarian-minded citizens to set-
tle.83  The process of actually seizing this vast tract of supposed wilderness
was not immediate, and in fact the frontier itself did not see a mad rush of
settlement until after the eighteenth century had already passed.84
But pass it did, and thus the strategy touted by Jefferson was revealed
as an incomplete one.85  It plotted out a means for the population to culti-
vate the virtues necessary in citizenship, but did not provide a way for such
benefits to continue indefinitely— inevitably, the parcels of land acquired
in the west would end where the frontier met its close.86  Furthermore, it
did little to prevent land transfers that would undermine republican vir-
tue— citizens could, theoretically, sell or gift land in such a way that it
allowed the aristocratic ownership Jefferson disdained to reemerge.87  Jef-
ferson’s solution was one that favored equality in distribution where the
government could naturally intervene, but restraint when it came to true
redistribution.88  Wary of the excesses of the British Crown, he and the
other Framers had little sympathy toward forcibly seizing land and then
dividing it out from its original owners— such actions reeked of the arbi-
79. Katz, supra note 68, at 12. R
80. See Orth, supra note 67, at 33– 34. R
81. Id. at 34.
82. See id. at 35
83. See Lance Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in
the New American Republic, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 5 (1986),.
84. See Kenneth Lockridge, Land, Population and the Evolution of New England Soci-
ety, 1630– 1790, in COLONIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 466
(Stanley N. Katz ed., 1971) (“Yet at first Americans moved only slowly out into the wil-
derness.  For most of the two hundred years preceding 1800 they clustered near the
eastern coastline.”).
85. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 34. R
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN304.txt unknown Seq: 12 28-JAN-19 9:57
742 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 51
trary monarchist actions the Revolution intended to dispense with.89
The fears of Jeffersonians over land was not limited to what may occur
should there be a lack of it.90  Rather, they feared also that it might lose its
value as a means of promoting virtue.91  Over time, not only would the
availability of new land decrease, but the nature of holding land might
change as well.92  The rise of commerce and fast-paced trade could free-
hold land to become more fluid, more of a commodity than something that
citizens might use for self-sufficiency and independence.93  In turn, this
commercialization of land would change social relations as well: people
who might have thought of each other as brothers and citizens would
instead see their peers only as buyers and sellers of the abstract economic
good that land had become.94
Jefferson knew that the only means of combating this was to keep land
available, circulating enough that its ownership was dynamic rather than
static, and therefore unlikely to become centralized into the hands of the
few.95  This was a prime motivation behind his numerous attempts at com-
bating English-style land laws, fighting against fee tails and inheritance
statutes that would allow privileged families to hold land hostage.96  What
this demonstrates, however, is that the fear of there being not enough land
for widespread ownership and too much freedom for it to be hoarded was
founded on several philosophical points Jefferson believed strongly.97  He
was conscious of dangers that might result from a concentration of wealth
such that the opportunity for ownership among the less wealthy shrank,
and sought to increase alienability where possible to prevent that.98  It is
not hard to imagine, then, that Jefferson would have sought further mea-
sures at the time that land availability took a sharp decline, and where the
chance of wealth concentration became ever greater.
III. Republicanism, Policy, and Contemporary Problems
A. Republicanism and the Estate Tax
1. The Early History of the Estate Tax in the United States
The earliest form of estate tax in American history arrived shortly
after the Constitution was adopted, with the Stamp Act of 1797.99  In
response to the fear of the French navy preying upon American shipping
and sailors, Congress passed the Act to raise funds for national defense,
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 34– 35.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 35.
96. See id. at 34.
97. See generally id.
98. See id.
99. See generally Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 527 (1797) (repealed 1802)
[hereinafter Stamp Act of 1797].
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and did so with duties upon the stamps necessary for wills, inventories,
letters of administration, and the “receipts and discharges from legacies
and intestate distributions of property.”100  The tax upon these bequests
was scaled based upon how large the bequest was, with additional amounts
added to the tax as the amount bequeathed by the decedent grew.101  Sev-
eral decades later, Congress again passed a tax upon legacies, this time in
response to a domestic crisis, with the Revenue Act of 1862.  Unlike its
predecessor, the Revenue Act included a tax that applied directly to per-
sonal property, though it originally did not include estates and was gradu-
ated based upon whom the decedent was specifying in the will, rather than
on the value or size of the property in question.102  In response to the ris-
ing costs of the Civil War, however, the Revenue Act was revised and reen-
acted in 1864, with new provisions that not only increased the legacy tax
rate, but also added a tax on bequests of real estate.103  Before the century
ended, a new tax was proposed to similar effect: the War Revenue Act of
1898.104  The Act of 1898 served as a more direct parallel to the modern
conception of an estate tax: it was a tax that targeted the estate itself, rather
than its beneficiaries, and was graduated based upon the size of the estate
as well as the relationship the decedent shared with the legatee.105
2. The Modern Estate Tax
It did not take long for the first modern estate tax to be enacted, a
duty that would not only focus on estates themselves, but would also con-
tinue to exist even after its wartime need expired: the Revenue Act of
1916.106  The new tax would apply to net estates— the total sum of prop-
erty that the decedent owned— and would be graduated such that only
those estates worth over $50,000 would have any tax, with estates exceed-
ing $5 million asked to pay ten percent.107  In the following years, certain
changes would be made to the existing estate tax to make it more wide-
ranging and effective, such as rules that regulated the transfer of gifts so as
to prevent individuals from escaping the estate tax via inter vivos transfers,
or allowing deductions in certain situations, such as when the property
transferred to the decedent’s spouse.108
Following this, the estate tax remained largely unchanged until a
major reform effort in 1976.109  The Tax Reform Act passed in that year
100. Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety
Years and Counting, 27 STAT. INCOME BULL. 119 (2007).
101. Stamp Act of 1797, at 527.
102. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 111, 12 Stat. 432, 485– 86 (repealed 1872) [here-
inafter Revenue Act of 1862].
103. See Jacobson, supra note 100, at 119. R
104. See generally Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, 30 Stat. 448 (1898) [hereinafter War
Revenue Act of 1898].
105. Jacobson, supra note 100, at 120 R
106. See generally Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756 [hereinafter Revenue Act
of 1916].
107. Id. at 777– 78.
108. Jacobson, supra note 100, at 122. R
109. See id.
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sought to create a more unified tax framework, in which both estate and
gift taxes where imposed at a single, combined rate.110  Prior to this
change, the price of merely selling one’s estate in life cost significantly less
in tax than leaving property in death.111  As a result, the tax system effec-
tively gave an incentive for property owners to gift as much of that property
as possible before their impending demise.112  The aim in unifying the gift
and estate taxes was to ensure that it was not significantly cheaper to gift
property than to leave it in inheritance, thus cutting away one loophole
that would allow accumulated wealth to build up intact.113  In addition,
the Tax Reform Act enacted new taxes on generation-skipping trusts, a
means often used to circumvent the estate tax by leaving assets in a testa-
mentary trust that the property owner’s children will open.114  By intro-
ducing new methods to ensure that these trusts could not wholly dodge
taxation, Congress once again took a step to combat the tax-free inheri-
tance of wealth.115
3. Repeal of the Estate Tax: The Recent Efforts
While the 20th century largely saw efforts to tinker with or build up
the estate tax, closing loopholes and providing exemptions as need saw fit,
the 21st century has seen a concerted effort to see that tax removed from
the books.116  During the first George W. Bush administration, Congress
embarked on a new tax policy with the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) of 2001, which deliberately targeted transfer
taxes for review and repeal.117  The most significant of these was the estate
tax itself: the EGTRRA laid the groundwork for the estate tax’s eventual
repeal.118  By gradually increasing the exemption amounts and outright
immunizing anyone who died in the year 2010, the EGTRRA was intended
to see the estate tax incrementally shrink to the point of uselessness, with
the hope to fully repeal the tax later on.119  The repeal never came:
although the estate tax suffered a “near-death experience” in 2010, it never-
theless lived on.120  In both 2010 and 2013, Congress would intervene to
ensure that the estate and gift tax regimes would continue, albeit with
higher exemption thresholds than in previous years.121
110. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) [hereinafter Tax Reform Act of
1976].
111. Jacobson, supra note 100, at 122. R
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 123.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 123– 24.
119. See id. at 124.
120. David G. Duff, Alternatives to the Gift and Estate Tax, 57 B.C. L. REV. 893, 893.
(2016).
121. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., HISTORY, PRESENT LAW,
AND ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM 4 (Comm. Print 2015).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN304.txt unknown Seq: 15 28-JAN-19 9:57
2018 The Republic of Virtue 745
At the same time, however, the tax is still much diminished from its
prior self, with the great increases in the tax-exempt threshold lowering its
range and effectiveness significantly.122  In its current state, the federal
estate tax is limited only to the portion of an estate’s value that goes
beyond the maximum exemption level— currently, $5.49 million for an
individual, and effectively twice that for a married couple due to spousal
exemptions.123  This amount is a stark difference even to the estate tax of
barely two decades ago: in 2001, prior to many of these recent changes, the
threshold for the estate tax was a much lower $650,000 for a given individ-
ual.124  Because of this, only a fraction of a percent of Americans— an esti-
mated 0.2%— are required to pay any income tax, let alone the highest
possible rate of it.125
Even for those who are subject to the estate tax, the amount actually
paid on their property rarely reaches the top rate of forty percent— on aver-
age, the most paid by an individual subject to the tax is less than half that,
a mere seventeen percent.126  Even with this lessened tax burden, the exis-
tence of common loopholes to avoid paying the estate tax, such as the use
of grantor retained annuity trusts, have allowed property owners to effort-
lessly circumvent the tax and hold onto large amounts of otherwise taxable
property.127  At the same time, wider and wider deductions have also
undermined the viability of the tax.  Certain strategic avenues like the
qualified terminable interest property marital deductions allow for the
uninhibited transfer of large amounts of property without restriction,
despite having little to do with the policy goals of marital deductions and
costing the government significant amounts in revenue.128  In a similar
vein, charitable deductions are often allowed even where the purpose of
donating is merely to benefit the donor.  Certain pseudo-charitable dona-
tions free the donor from transfer taxes to the extent that it allows even
more value to pass to a future beneficiary without fear of taxation.129
122. See id. at 11– 12
123. CHYE-CHING HUANG & CHLOE CHO, TEN FACTS YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, D.C. 1 (2017), available at
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-8-15tax.pdf  [https://perma.cc/
TC6A-4KAD ].
124. Id. at 2.
125. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 121, at 1.
126. HUANG & CHO, supra note 123, at 2. R
127. The GRAT loophole alone is estimated to have allowed upwards of $100 billion
to go untaxed, because of property owners closing their assets in such trusts. Id. at 3;
see also Wendy C. Gerzog, Toward a Reality-Based Estate Tax, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1037, 1052
(2016).
128. “Unlike the terminable interest exception for a qualifying income interest cou-
pled with a general power of appointment, the QTIP exception allows the predeceasing
spouse to receive the benefits of a marital deduction without ceding control or owner-
ship of the transferred property to the surviving spouse.  The fiction of the QTIP as a
marital transfer is intrinsically abusive.  It also results in a significant current revenue
loss.”  Gerzog, supra note 127, at 1056.
129. See id. at 1058.
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B. Estate Tax Policy and Republicanism
1. The Purpose and Effects of the Estate Tax
The precise effect of the estate tax is a subject not entirely settled, and
still hotly debated among economists and scholars.  One consistent criti-
cism of the estate tax is that it reduces the amount of savings in a given
market, which has the additive effect of reducing growth.130  Because a
major incentive to save is the desire for gathered money and property to be
passed on to one’s children, an increase in estate taxes— or indeed the exis-
tence of such a tax at all— could potentially “increase the price of providing
for one’s heirs relative to the price of providing for oneself.”131  Whether
this will actually reduce the amount of saving remains unclear: the estate
tax’s impact depends “upon the testator’s elasticity of demand for
bequests.”.132  Nevertheless, Wagner states that the most likely conse-
quence will be a lower savings rate, and thus a slower rate of economic
growth and progress than would be otherwise.133
The usefulness of the estate tax as a revenue-raising instrument also
remains controversial.  As previously mentioned, the United States estate
tax was originally implemented almost purely as a means of bringing in
new tax revenue under pressing circumstances, whether during the cash-
starved early years of the republic or its most grave hour in the Civil
War.134  In each case, the estate tax was also set aside once the urgent need
for additional revenue had run its course, and normalcy could return.135
But even after the progressive estate tax was enacted on a more permanent
basis in the United States, Britain, and other nations, it never served as a
major source of revenue for any of those countries, and its already small
role declined further as income, consumption, and social security taxes
increasingly usurped its place.136  Though the estate tax might still bring
in some revenue, these more modern methods of taxation have largely
proven to have greater efficacy and efficiency in bringing in revenue for
their respective countries than the estate tax had previously been.137  Thus,
rather than arguing in favor of the estate tax as a means of bringing in
more funds, this Note will instead focus on an argument that has seen more
favor with scholars: using the estate tax to reduce the concentration of
130. See RICHARD E. WAGNER, INHERITANCE AND THE STATE: TAX PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE
AND PROSPEROUS COMMONWEALTH 16 (1977).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 17.
133. Id. at 19.
134. See Duff, supra note 120, at 895.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. In the United States, for example, the estate tax never commanded a greater per-
centage of total tax revenues than a mere 4.6% in 1941, declined to an even lower two
percent in the 1970s, and continued to fall to a projected 0.6% in 2015.  In the United
Kingdom, revenues acquired by the estate tax reached a peak of 16.1% prior to 1915,
but sharply declined after, declining to a scant 0.8% since 1982.  This decline in the
revenue-raising potential of the estate tax has been echoed in other OECD countries as
well. Id. at 896– 97.
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wealth, and to promote equality of opportunity.138
There is reason to believe that the absence of the estate tax would
worsen the problems of inequality in the United States.  In an analysis of
the consequences of an estate tax repeal, researcher Lisa Keister found that
preserving the more progressive estate tax of the mid-1970s, with a top rate
of seventy-seven percent and substantially lower exemptions, would have
significantly reduced the income inequality later resulting from the stock
market booms of the 1990s.139  Comparing the concentration of wealth in
these varying models, the preservation of the progressive estate tax would
have lowered the share of wealth owned by the top one percent of economic
earners by four percent in 1983, and by eight percent in 1998.140  By con-
trast, the middle class would have swelled to own a ten-percent larger share
of the total wealth in America.141
2. The Estate Tax and the Republican Tradition
Even if we accept that the estate tax would accomplish the goals of
combating excessive wealth accumulation, a larger question remains: can
the estate tax be justified on republican grounds?  While it is true that
major figures in the formation of republicanism as a theory believed that
the ideal distribution of property was one of numerous small, independent
owners, that does not necessarily mean that republicanism can support
redistribution, or that they would find such affirmative measures advisa-
ble.142  Considering the importance of private property in the minds of
republican thinkers in the United States, could a redistributive method like
the estate tax, aimed at combating the accumulation of wealth, be sup-
ported by republicanism itself?  Despite these doubts, there is reason to
believe that it can, from the testimony of these republican thinkers
themselves.
In letters sent to his fellow American statesmen and contacts else-
where, Thomas Jefferson showed a remarkable sympathy towards the idea
of a method meant to prevent estates from being inherited intact.143  Dis-
cussing the rights of both preceding and succeeding generations over mod-
ern society in a letter to James Madison, Jefferson laid out a stark
philosophy as to the rights of the deceased over the way property is
distributed:
138. “In contrast to these small percentages, the OECD reports that ‘income profits
and capital gains taxes’ generally accounted for between 25% and 60% of total tax reve-
nues in OECD countries in 2012, representing 46.9% of all U.S. taxes, [and] 35.6% of
U.K. taxes. . . .” Id. at 897– 98.
139. WILLIAM H. GATES, SR. & CHUCK COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR COMMONWEALTH:
WHY AMERICA SHOULD TAX ACCUMULATED FORTUNES 24 (2002).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 25.
142. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 33– 34. R
143. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 1 THE REPUB-
LIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN JEFFERSON AND MADISON, 1776– 1826 631,
631– 32 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
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I set out on this ground, which I suppose to be self-evident, “that the earth
belongs in usufruct to the living”: that the dead have neither powers nor rights
over it.  The portion occupied by an individual ceases to be his when himself
ceases to be, and reverts to the society. . . .  Then no man can, by natural
right, oblige the lands he occupied, or the persons who succeed him in that
occupation, to the paiment [sic] of debts contracted by him.  For if he could,
he might, during his own life, eat up the usufruct of the lands for several
generations to come, and then the lands would belong to the dead, and not
to the living, which would be the reverse of our principle.144
In general, Jefferson shows a skepticism that the qualities of property
or property ownership should remain the same from one generation to the
next.145  He applies this principle to a number of potential scenarios,
including the continuation of debts from one’s ancestor, or even in the
validity of laws passed down from a prior age to the modern one.146  It is
this same logic that causes him to be skeptical of the use of the fee tail in
property ownership, or of the feudal privileges placed on lands, all of
which were issues he would go on to scribe into the law.147  In general,
Jefferson viewed this attitude towards generational property as being one
in stark contrast to the older tradition of “English precedent,” and viewed
the deference of the United States to these conceptions of property— allow
passage of ownership without change from ancestor to descendent— as a
habit “which fetters us with all the political heresies of a nation equally
remarkable for it’s early excitement from some errors, and long slumbering
under others.”148
Though Jefferson was a prominent supporter of ideas resembling the
estate tax, he was by no means the only figure in republicanism to do so.
Other Founding Fathers, such as John Adams, spoke at length on the value
of property distributions as a means of promoting virtue.  Writing to a
contemporary, Adams cited the examples of Harrington to demonstrate
how a balance of property ownership in society was necessary to preserve
republican government:
The only possible way, then, of preserving the balance of power on the side
of equal liberty and public virtue, is to make the acquisition of land easy to
every member of society; to make a division of the land into small quantities,
so that the multitude may be possessed of landed estates.  If the multitude is
possessed of the balance of real estate, the multitude will have the balance of
power, and in that case the multitude will take care of the liberty, virtue, and
interest of the multitude, in all acts of government.149
This principle of power following property is one that Adams believed
preexisted any American attempt at rebellion, having been fostered in the
144. Id. at 632.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 634– 35.
147. See id. at 635.
148. Id. at 635– 36.
149. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in IX THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS 376– 77 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Little, Brown & Co., 1854).
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continent from the earliest days of colonization.150  He believed this was a
standard that any nation had to be exceedingly cautious in deviating from,
particularly at a time in which the ability to vote was still tied to property
ownership.151  Though that particular suffrage element of American
democracy might be gone in the present day, it nevertheless stands that
Adams shared many of Jefferson’s views on the vital nature of property
ownership in creating a productive and conscious citizenry able to main-
tain the republic and its ideals.152
Both Adams and Jefferson believed that a certain dynamism in prop-
erty ownership could work wonders in supplying the land necessary for
the republic to flourish.153  That dynamism could not be conjured out of
thin air, without any changes to the way the government approached prop-
erty— instead, it had to be cultivated using reforms and legislations that
attacked the foundations of aristocracy in property.154  Because both men
believed that excess privilege and luxury could ruin a republic by sapping
at necessary virtues, they wanted this dynamic style of property that
resisted being hoarded by the few, choosing land liberty over stability, one
that could withstand the pressures of the privileged.155
In this instance, that liberty of land meant demolishing styles of own-
ership and inheritance that would stop a common citizen from acquiring
the small parcel of land necessary for his self-sufficiency and security, the
one that would tie him to his community and give him the platform he
needed to take part in the political process.156  Thus, to both Adams and
Jefferson, “Liberating the land . . . meant liberating the individual.”157
Considering this attitude, a measure taken to discourage the accumulation
of excess land and wealth in the form of a tax upon death and inheritance
would find fertile ground in this ‘liberation’ theory of land ownership and
distribution.
Thomas Paine also wrote on the ideas of land reform in pamphlets
concerning “Agrarian Justice,” and supported the notion that cultivated
land— having originally existed in common for the entire human race—
must be compensated for when certain individuals garner so much of it
that others are forced to do without.158
It is a position not to be controverted, that the earth, in its natural unculti-
vated state, was, and ever would have continued to be, the common property
of the human race. In that state every man would have been born to property.
He would have been a joint life-proprietor with rest in the property of the
soil, and in all its natural productions, vegetable and animal.159
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 37. R
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. See THOMAS PAINE, AGRARIAN JUSTICE 6 (London, 1797).
159. Id.
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Despite this being the natural state of affairs, Paine states that “the
landed monopoly” has perverted the value of cultivation by dispossessing
others of the ability to own land or property of their own, thus creating a
large population of individuals beset by “poverty and wretchedness that
did not exist before” the system of land ownership and improvement
began.160  To combat this, Paine advocated for a “ground rent”: that there
would be a common fund, paid for by both the aforementioned “landed
monopoly” and the citizenry at large, the purpose of which was to indem-
nify and compensate for the loss of land that these dispossessed members
of society now faced.161
This proposal, radical in its day, shows that the republican philosophy
of the day was open to strategies far bolder than the estate tax in the hopes
of achieving balance in property ownership and wealth distribution.  While
few references by these past voices specifically authorize an estate tax for
the purposes of combating wealth inequality, they nevertheless make clear
not only that goal’s importance, but also acceptable methods not dissimi-
lar to it.  The Framers and their contemporaries believed for a certainty
that the lifeblood of republicanism lay with a dynamic order of property
ownership that did not allow for aristocratic control, and that the best
means of ensuring this was by attacking key structures in the inheritance
system.162  The estate tax, while not an exact analogue, is nevertheless sim-
ilar enough that it can fall under this broad umbrella of acceptable distrib-
utive methods.
Conclusion
As the estate tax comes under increasing pressure from all sides, it is
important that we determine just how rooted in American ideals such a
measure truly is.  On the one hand, it is true that Lockean theories of pri-
vate property remain a stalwart influence on the nation, one which may be
used to argue against the estate tax.163  On the other hand, however, the
equally venerable theory of republicanism— one adopted and developed by
the Framers themselves— can justify its continuation.  Applying the princi-
ples of republicanism to this specific context, one can see how closely its
tenets align with the goals of the estate tax, acting as a method of prevent-
ing aristocratic wealth accumulation and defending against gross inequali-
ties that can harm a republic.164  Based upon the stated interests of a
republican government in encouraging virtue amongst its citizens, the
estate tax can be used to foster the small, independent land-owners that
men like Jefferson sought.165  Though it is true that republicanism has
some reluctance  to redistribute existing wealth, that need not stop it from
160. Id. at 7.
161. Id.
162. See Katz, supra note 68, at 11. R
163. See Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property (Rights): Nozick, Libertarian-
ism, and the Estate Tax, 66 MAINE L. REV. 2, 3 (2013).
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justifying the use of an estate tax.  Whether or not the estate tax survives is
yet to be seen.  When applying republicanism to it, however, one can see
how closely one can follow the other.
